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SOME ASPECTS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SOI. FA.
ACT FOR THE ADDITION OF DEFENDANTS
NOT ORIGINALLY SUED
(ACT OF APRIL IO, 1929, P. L. 479)
WARWICK POTTER SCOTT
THE ACT AND ITS PURPOSE

The much discussed Pennsylvania Sci. Fa. Act of 1929 is
simple in purpose and brief in expression. Its purpose is the
equitable one of adjudicating by one suit all the rights of all the
parties arising out of a particular transaction or occurrence.1 The
Act in its entirety reads as follows:
"AN ACT
"To regulate procedure where a defendant desires to
have joined as additional defendants persons whom he
alleges are liable over to him, or jointly or severally liable
with him, for the cause of action declared on.
"Section I. Be it enacted, &c., That any defendant,
named in any action, may sue out, as of course, a writ of
scire facias to bring upon the record as an additional defendant any other person alleged to be liable over to him for the
cause of action declared on, or jointly or severally liable
therefor with him, with the same force and effect as if such
other had been originally sued, and such suit shall continue,
both before and after judgment according to equitable principles, although at common law, or under existing statutes,
the plaintiff could not properly have joined all such parties as
defendants."

THE Two

APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS. THE ACT APPLIED TO
THE SITUATION OF LIABILITY OVER

The only two judicial pronouncements of Appellate Courts
upon the Act are the well known cases of Vinnacombe et ux. v,.
See generally THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF PENNSYLVANIA BAR
AssoIATIoN (I928), particularly 42, 43.
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Philadelphia et al.,2 and First National Bank of Pittsburgh v.
Baird.3 Justice Simpson wrote the opinion of the Court in both
cases. In the Vinnacombe case Chief Justice Frazer, then an
Associate, dissented upon a secondary question.
It will not be profitable to set forth in detail the now wellknown principal doctrines laid down in these cases by Justice
Simpson. Of the Vinnacombe case suffice it to say that the City
of Philadelphia was sued by plaintiff for damages caused by a
defective sidewalk. The City's right of action over against the
abutting owner, added by sci. fa. to the record, was sustained,
and the Act declared constitutional.
In the Pittsburgh Bank case, the holder in due course of
negctiable paper sued the accommodation maker, whose right
of action over against the executors of one Reed, the accommodated or real party in interest on the note, was sustained. The
court said, inter alia, in the latter case that there was no reason,
if justice required it, why the separate issue between the original
defendant and the additional defendant liable over to the original
defendant should not be separately tried, though under the same
term and number.
In both cases Justice Simpson stresses the proposition that
the Act was not intended to give to the plaintiff any additional
rights. From this premise he draws the then inevitable conclusion that the issue created by the sci. fa. is strictly between the
two classes of defendants only and has no bearing whatsoever
upon the issue between the plaintiff and the original defendant.
This is most strongly emphasized by his statement, already noted,
in the PittsburghBank case, that the issue between the two classes
of defendants may be separately tried. In that case the question
was in fact raised upon a rule for judgment as between the two
defendants.
The only other noteworthy features of the two decisions are
that in the Vinnacombe opinion Justice Simpson laid down forms
for pracipcb and writs and what virtually amounted to rules of
a297 Pa. 564, 147 Atl. 826 (1929).
30D Pa. 92, 5o At]. 165 (930).

Pennsylvania seems to be the only juris-

diction in which a statute of this nature exists.
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4
court, holding that Section 3 of the Act of June i6, I836, empowered the Supreme Court so to do. In an opinion which concurred generally with the effect of the Vinnacombe decision, Chief
Justice Frazer dissented from this one point, holding that the cited
Section of the Act of 1836 had been impliedly superseded by
subsequent legislation and that the function of rule-making was
exclusively in the Common Pleas. In the Pittsburgh Bank case
Justice Simpson seems in some degree to defer to the Chief

Justice's view. 5

So much for what these two decisions actually hold. Let us
consider whether the holdings are in the last degree conducive to
the fulfillment of the legislative purpose, for that is the avowed
intention of the Court. In the Vinnacombe case Justice Sinipson
says:
the statute is to be liberally construed to advance
the legislative purpose:.

.

."

7

He also says on the same page:
"Nothing in the act shows the slightest intention to
affect plaintiffs in such suits. Consequently, the adding of
additional defendants will give no higher right to plaintiffs
than they had before. As to them the action proceeds against
the original defendant only, exactly as it would have done if
the additional defendants had not been named, . . ."
If the purpose of the Act is, as stated at the beginning of this
article, to adjudicate by one suit all the rights of all the parties
arising out of a particular transaction or occurrence, that purpose
'P. L. 784, 786.
"In all civil litigation, the trial courts, at least to the extent that they are
not inhibited by statute, have the power to control the procedure so as to attain
'justice without sale, denial or delay'. It may be said, generally speaking, that,
in the absence of applicable legislation, this control is only limited by the constitutional requirements of the right of trial by jury, and the litigant's right to
a full and fair hearing before judgment is entered against him. . . ." 300 Pa.
at ioi, 15o At]. 165, at 169.
. The Statute of Limitations is held not to apply to the issue between
the two defendants, seemingly on the theory that the original defendant's cause
oi action over does not arise until the original defendant is sued. The original
defendant must then, however, act promptly. See Vinnacombe case, supra note
2, at 569, 147 Atl. at 828.
' Supra note 2.at 569, 147 Atl. at 828.
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is defeated by the last quoted words of Justice Simpson. It cannot be denied that the plaintiff injured by a defective sidewalk
has a direct right of action against the abutting owner. Solely
from the viewpoint of disposing expeditiously of the business of
the courts, it is clearly desirable that this direct right of action
between plaintiff and added defendant should be settled in this
suit. It is not difficult to imagine a situation where the municipality originally sued would be found to be insolvent and the
abutting owner financially responsible. For what good reason
should the plaintiff in such a situation be put to the necessity of
instituting an entirely separate suit against the additional defendant?
If we are to construe the Act liberally in accordance with the
avowed intention of the Court, there seems no fundamental reason
why the mere fact that the plaintiff did not originally sue the
additional defendant should prevent the plaintiff from obtaining a
judgment directly against the additional defendant. It is a
common occurrence that a complainant who brings his bill on the
equity side of the court ultimately obtains a decree giving him
direct rights against various defendants or respondents who were
added to the record in one way or another subsequently to the
filing of the original bill. Why should such a consummation
be obnoxious in a proceeding under the Sci. Fa. Act, especially
as the Act itself says that after the additional defendant has been
added:
such suit shall continue, both before and after
judgment, according to equitable principles . . ."

s

Except for this feature, which, we respectfully submit, unnecessarily curtails the complete fulfillment of the avowed purpose
of the Act, it would seem that a literal interpretation of everything
that is said in both the Vinnacombe and PittsburghBank opinions
as applied to any phase of the situation of liability over presents
no serious difficulties whatever save one.
'To these words there is reference in the Vinnacombe opinion, supra note
at top of page 570, 147 Atl. at 828.

2,
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That difficulty arises only in cases where federal jurisdiction
is introduced by reason of diversity of citizenship existing only
between the two classes of defendants. If the issue between
plaintiff and original defendant is to be as rigidly distinguished,
as the Supreme Court declares it must be, from the issue between
the original and the additional defendant, the rule that where one
of several joint defendants is a citizen of the same state as the
plaintiff there is no right to federal jurisdiction, obviously has no
application.
In the pending case of Thompson v. Philadelphia, et al.,'
plaintiff, a resident of Philadelphia, sued the City in a "sidewalk
case." The City, by sci. fa. alleging liability over, joined a foreign corporation, the owner of the abutting premises. The amount
involved being in excess of $4000, counsel for additional defendant secured a removal to the United States Court. Judge F. S.
Brown, Jr., of Common Pleas, was in doubt as to whether to send
down the entire record or to split the case (in the manner seemingly authorized in the Pittsburgh Bank opinion) and send down
only the issue as between the two defendants, there being no diversity of citizenship as between plaintiff and the original defendant.
The entire record was sent down and has been docketed in the
United States Court, but has not as yet been listed for a hearing,
so that it is still unknown whether the United States Court will
take jurisdiction. If the United States Court refuses to entertain
the entire case, including both issues, on the ground that it has no
statutory authority to pass upon the claim sounding in tort of a
citizen of Philadelphia against his own City, and remands the
whole record to Common Pleas, there can be no appeal from such
action. The Common Pleas Court would of course not repeatedly
send the case to the Federal Court to invite repeated refusals of
the United States judges to take jurisdiction. To split the two
issues and adjudicate that between plaintiff and original defendant
in the Common Pleas and that between the two classes of defendants in the Federal Court would seem cumbersome in the last degree and unsatisfactory to both jurisdictions as well as to the litiI C. C. P. 4, June Term, i929, No. 68I, removed to U. S. District Court,
E. D. of Pa., December Sessions 1929, No. 15,140.
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gants. The third and last resort would be to adjudicate the entire
matter in Common Pleas. This of course is impossible, being a
denial of the constitutional rights of the foreign corporation joined
as additional defendant.
No solution of this problem appears. If in fact there is no
solution, the practical result would seem to be that in such case
the writ of sci. fa. would have to be quashed upon motion of the
additional defendant. This unfortunate necessity does not of
itself strike out the usefulness of the Act as a whole, but merely
excludes from its useful scope cases of liability over where diversity of citizenship exists between the two classes of defendants
only and where there is nothing that would give the United States
Courts jurisdiction of the issue between the plaintiff and the
original defendant and where the amount involved is not less
than $4ooo.
THE CONCEPTION OF RIGIDLY SEPARATE ISSUES IN THE SITUATION OF JOINT LIABILITY AS DISTINGUISHED FROm LIABILITY OVER. THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTIONSHIP
AS A BASIS FOR THE SEPARATE RIGHT OF THE
ORIGINAL DEFENDANT AGAINST AN
ADDED JOINT DEFENDANT
The Finnacombe and Pittsburgh Bank opinions are couched
in language which is general and which, if read by itself, might
be taken to be intended to apply to all cases arising under the Sci.
Fa. Act whether the factual situation were that of liability over
or joint liability. 10
For the moment let us assume that this is the case and that
also in the situation of joint liability, the issue between the plaintift and the original defendant is rigidly to be distinguished from
"It has been so interpreted in a number of lower court decisions, %4z.:
Cohen v. Philadelphia Rural Transit Co., 13 D. & C. 465 (193o) (Philadelphia
C. C. P. 2, opinion by Gordon, Jr., J.) ; Gilkey v. Montag, 13 D. & C. 717 (1930) ;
O'Brien et ux. v. Erb et aL., unreported, C. C. P. 2, March Term, 1928, No. 12895,
consolidated with case arising from same accident, C. C. P. 5, June Term, 1928,
No. 10373, ruling by Martin, P. J., without opinion filed; Kauffman v. Tidewater
Oil Co., unreported, C. C. P. 2, June Term 193o, No. 5123, ruling by Stern, P. J.,
without opinion filed.
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the issue between the two classes of defendants, and that the plaintiff has no direct right against the additional defendant."1
Upon what can we found the right of an original defendant
against an additional joint defendant? There is clearly nothing
available as a basis for such an issue unless it be the right of
contribution, and whether or not that is available as it exists
in Pennsylvania law is open to considerable question. The doctrine of contributionship as it exists today in Pennsylvania is described and limited by the classic opinion of Justice Schaffer in
Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co.12 The Goldman decision stands

for the single proposition that where plaintiff obtains a judgment
jointly against two tort feasors and where one of the two pays
the entire amount of the judgment, the payer is entitled to have
the judgment marked to his use and may proceed by the doctrine
of contributionship to recover back from the other judgment
debtor one-half of what was paid; the operation of the doctrine
being confined to cases involving non-wilful torts. In the Goldman opinion, Justice Schaffer says significantly:
" . . . Our decision is predicated upon this use of the
remedy . . . " 13
It will at once be seen that the doctrine is being very considerably extended if it be applied to cases where the two defendants are not joint judgment debtors of the plaintiff but are
merely joint defendants being sued in an action sounding in tort,
in which no judgment against either has as yet been recovered.
From a strictly logical standpoint there is no reason why the
doctrine should not be extended to that degree provided the joint
tort feasors stand, as it were, in pari delicto. If, however, the relationship of each of the two to the plaintiff is not identical, no doctrine of contributionship can be applied (before a judgment is
obtained against both in favor of the plaintiff as in the Goldman
case) without introducing into Pennsylvania jurisprudence the
most complicated refinements of comparative negligence.
' The propriety of adopting such a view will be later discussed.
12292

Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231 (1928).

'Ibid. at 365, 141 At. at 235.
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For example: the settled law of Pennsylvania imposes upon
the motorman of a trolley the duty to observe a very high degree
of care towards the passengers in his car. His duty towards persons and vehicles in the street is merely the duty of ordinary care
which the law imposes on all travelers on a public highway, slightly
lessened in the case of a motorman by the fact that the public
franchise gives the trolley company the "dominant" right upon
its own track. If a passenger in a trolley is injured by reason
of a right angle collision between a trolley and a truck, in which
it appears that the trolley was approaching the intersection in
question from the right and therefore had a technical right of
way under Section 1013 (a) of the Act of VIay I, I929,11 and if
the plaintiff sues the trucking company, which adds the trolley
company by sci. fa. as being jointly liable, can there be any contributionship? It is clear that in a direct action by the passenger
against the motorman's company, the passenger can recover if
the motorman fell short of the very high degree of care required
of him towards his passengers; but in the proceeding under the
Sci. Fa. Act which we have supposed, the passenger has no direct
right against the motorman's company. The only claim against
which the trolley company must defend in such a proceeding is that
of the trucking company to which the duty of care owed by the
motorman was measurable by an entirely different yardstick from
his duty owed to his passenger. As has already been noted, to
the trucking company he owed only the ordinary degree of care,
lessened by the two factors (which are merely make-weights
to point the contrast) that the trolley had the dominant right upon
its "track and was approaching the intersection from the right.
In such a case let us suppose the situation visualized by Justice Simpson in Lh PittsburghBank case, 15 namely, that the plaintiff has already obtained a verdict and judgment against the trucking company, the original defendant, and that the issue between
the original and additional defendants is to be separately tried,
although under the same term and number. We then have the
original defendant in court already adjudged guilty of negligence
,P. L. 9o5, 979-980.
Supra note 3, at 96 et seq., i5o At. 167.
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in failing to observe even the ordinary degree of care required of
it in the circumstances. Certainly if the claim were for damages
to the truck instead of for contribution, the contributory negligence of the trucking company would be a conclusive defense in
the hands of the trolley company. Even on the basis of the
separate issue which we have supposed, tried after plaintiff reduced its claim against the original defendant to judgment, the
original defendant in this separate issue does not stand as an agent
or trustee for the plaintiff passenger who has already recovered
his judgment and departed from the picture. In the issue separately tried between the two defendants, the plaintiff passenger
is in no sense the use-plaintiff. If it chanced that the original
defendant was execution-proof, with the result that plaintiff's
judgment was uncollectible, plaintiff would notwithstanding have
no special lien upon the original defendant's right of action,
if any, against the additional defendant. The proceeds of any
judgment recovered by an insolvent original defendant from a
solvent additional defendant could by assignment readily be placed
beyond the reach of the empty-handed plaintiff. Such proceeds
would have exactly the same status as any other personal assets
of the original defendant and therefore could be made available
to plaintiff only by the timely and successful issuance of attachment execution or proceedings of that nature.
All this is merely to show that the position of the original
defendant in a separate trial under the same term and number of
the issue between the two defendants is not a vicarious position.
The original defendant does not represent the plaintiff passenger
but stands in its own shoes. It therefore cannot complain of the
conduct of the motorman on the ground merely that the latter
failed to observe the higher and more exacting degree of care
owed to passengers within the trolley. The yardstick for the
motorman's conduct would at the most be that which measures
his ordinary and less stringent duty towards a truck driver outside
of his trolley who has an inferior right upon the track and who
is approaching a right angle intersection from the left.
A striking analogy to the situation just imagined, and an
authority for what seems to be the undoubtedly correct proposi-
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tion that the doctrine of contributionship cannot be applied before
judgment as between joint defendants who do not stand in pari
delicto towards the plaintiff, is to be found in an opinion of Judge
Gordon, Jr., in the case of Cohen v. PhiladelphiaRural Transit
Company, original defendant, and City of Philadelphia,additional
defendant.1" In that case plaintiff sued the Transit Company
which brought the City upon the record as additional defendant by
means of a writ of sci. fa. (in which there were certain formal
defects not necessary to mention here). The City demurred to
the writ. The only substantive question of law considered by
Judge Gordon was whether a right of contribution existed under
the doctrine of the Goldman case. The plaintiff was a fireman
employed by the City, injured in the course of his employment
by reason of a collision between fire truck and trolley. The demurrer was sustained on the ground that while there might be
joint tort-feasorship, the respective liabilities of the two defendants to the plaintiff were of a different nature, that of the Transit
Company being on the theory of ordinary negligence, and that
of the City being under the Workmen's Compensation law. The
following sentence is highly significant:
the liability of the two defendants to the plaintiff
being therefore fundamentally different in nature, the question arises whether a right to contribution exists between
them merely because they were joint tort-feasors." 17
The Court then concludes that no such right exists.
Nothing further need be said to make perfectly plain that
no doctrine of contributionship upon the flat "fifty-fifty" basis
upon which Justice Schaffer predicates the use of the remedy in
the Goldman case can be applied where the nature or degree of
the duty owed by each alleged joint tort-feasor to the plaintiff is
not the same. If there is to be contributionship at all, as between
joint tort-feasors who do not stand in pari delicto, it must be
worked out upon the theory of comparative negligence.
The Supreme and Superior Courts have many times stated
that the doctrine of comparative negligence is no part of the law
'sSupra

17

note io.

Ibid. at 466.
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of Pennsylvania. It would be difficult indeed to conceive of an
average jury fairly and properly applying so delicate and complicated a doctrine, although in some jurisdictions they are instructed to do so. However, the pros and cons of whether or
not the State Legislature should introduce comparative negligence
into Pennsylvania law need not concern us. The fundamental
fact is unquestionable that the doctrine of comparative negligence
does not exist in Pennsylvania today.
It surely will not be contended that the few short sentences
which comprise the entire Sci. Fa. Act I (quoted in full at the
beginning of this article) and which contain no reference, express or implied, to any doctrine of substantive law, can be interpreted to sweep forever into oblivion all the present law of this
Commonwealth as to the established doctrine of negligence and
contributory negligence and to substitute therefor a highly complicated and entirely new doctrine of comparative negligence based
on an entirely unwarranted interpretation of the simple and strictly
limited doctrine of contributorship laid down in the Goldman
case.
In the Vinnacoinbe case, 19 Justice Simpson says of the Act:
"It is procedural in its nature . ..

."

The title to the Act begins with the words:
"An Act to regulate procedure . ..

In the Pittsburgh Bank case

20

."

Justice Simpson says:

" . . . the Courts must accept the legislation as it is written
and apply what it says . ..

."

There is certainly nothing "written" in this purely procedural
Act which would warrant the adoption by any Court of the view
that the Act was intended to destroy the present substantive
law of negligence and contributory negligence, and to substitute in
its place the entirely new substantive doctrine of comparative
' April lO, 1929, P. L. 479.

'9 Supra note 2, at 57o, 147 Atl. at 828.
'Supra note 3, at ioo, 15o Atl. at 68.
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negligence which has hitherto been expressly outlawed by the
decisions.
Justice Simpson says in the Vinnacombe case 21 that:
. . . the statute is to be liberally construed to advance the
legislative purpose . . . ";
but if the "legislative purpose" had been to revolutionize a doctrine
of substantive law as old as this Commonwealth and with which
the legislators must be presumed to be fully acquainted, that purpose would have been "written" into the statute and would not
have been left wholly to the imagination under an Act entitled:
"An Act to regulate procedure ....
WHILE THE INTERPRETATION OF THE

"

Sci. FA.

ACT IN SITUA-

TIONS INVOLVING LIABILITY OVER IS NOW TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE SETTLED BY THE DECISIONS, AND PRESENTS FEW GREAT PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES, IT IS
DOUBTFUL WHETHER ANY PRACTICABLE INTERPRETATION OF IT MAY BE DEVISED BY THE
COURTS IN THE SITUATION OF JOINT
DEFENDANTS W I T H 0 U T FURTHER
LEGISLATION,

UNLESS THE WORDS

OF THE ACT ITSELF AND OF
OTHER UNREPEALED STATUTES
BE WHOLLY IGNORED

The Vinzacombe decision is based upon the situation of liability over. The same is true of the PittsburqhBank case. It is
respectfully submitted that there is nothing in Justice Simpson's

language in those two opinions which raises any serious problems
when applied to the situation of liability over; 22 but it is submitted that in the situation of joint liability, unrepealed legislation
and the plain words of the Sci. Fa. Act itself would make it positively necessary for the Courts of Pennsylvania to refrain from
applying to that situation what Justice Simpson has said in the
Vinnacombe and Pittsburgh Bank opinions in connection with
2t

147 At. at 828.
The only seemingly insoluble problem in the situation of liability over is
discussed supra page 310.

Supra note 2, at 569,
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the situation of liability over. To be sure his language is general,
as has already been noted; but this does not import that it was
intended to apply to situations of fact quite different from the
facts of those two cases. In the closing portions of the Pittsburgh Bank opinion he indicates clearly that his words are not
intended as a permanent solvent for all difficulties which may in
the future arise under the Act, but that, as has been the case
with other statutes, " . . . seeming difficulties
23
,,.
.ironed out as they arise .

.

.

.

"

must be

Even if the words of unrepealed statutes were not mandatory upon the courts, Justice Simpson's own words in another case
relating to the interpretation of written documents, including
prior opinions of the Supreme Court, would of themselves be a
sufficient warrant for confining strictly to the situation of liability over the words of both the Vinnacombe and the Pittsburgh
Bank cases. In Schnee et al. v. Elston et u.X, 2 4 quoting his own
words used on a former occasion, the Justice said:
" .r, In Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Eavenson, 295 Pa. 357, 363, we said: 'The error of the court below consisted in wresting the words relied on from their
subject-matter and obvious purpose. It is axiomatic that
this can never be done; . . . however general the language
may be, their scope and effect are necessarily limited and
controlled thereby; ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit
optima interpretatio; verba generalia restringunturad habilitatem rei vel personam; Codding v. Wood, 112 Pa. 371;
Smith's Est., 21o Pa. 604; Silverthorn v. Silverthorn, 276
Pa. 579. In Comm. v. Budd Wheel Co., 290 Pa. 380, where
an earlier opinion of this court was being construed,' . . .
we said that 'controlling effect must be given to the subjectmatter being considered when the language is used.' The
same principle is applicable wherever the meaning of words,
oral or written, is being considered, for only thus can it be
known what the parties intended . .. ."
It is respectfully submitted that where the situation is joint
liability as distinguished from liability over, the statutory mandates quoted below are constitutionally binding upon the Courts.
The Sci. Fa. Act of 1929 provides in part:
' Supra note 3, at 10I, 15o At. at 168.
Pa. 100, 106-107, 149 AtI. io8, io9 (193o).
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" . . . That any defendant, named in any action, may
sue out, as of course, a writ of scire facias to bring upon
the record as an additional defendant any other person alleged
to be . . . jointly or severally liable therefor with him,
with the same force and effect as if such other had been
originally sued, ...." (Italics ours.)
If, then, we obey the behest of Justice Simpson, namely, that
" . . the Courts must accept the legislation as it is written,
and apply what it says despite the suggested difficulties . . . "0_.5

we have no choice but to treat an added joint defendant "as if
such such other had been originally sued," i. e., as if both defendants had been originally sued. Unless those words of the Act "as
it is written" are meaningless, the plaintiff's direct rights against
the added defendant can be adjudicated in this proceeding. This
result is a happy one, entirely in keeping with the apparent purpose of the Act as already stated, namely, to adjudicate by one
siut all the rights of all the parties arising out of a particular
transaction or occurrence.
There are, however, serious practical difficulties unless the
legislation be amended. The Act of 1929 contains no repealer
clause, either express or implied. It merely states that the fact that
the plaintiff might not have been able under pre-existing statutes
to join "all such parties as defendants" shall not be a bar to the
operation of the statute. This brings us squarely face to face with
Section I of the Joint Suit Act of June 29, 1923,26 which provides:

" . . . whenever it is pleaded in any suit that two or more
defendants are jointly liable for the cause of action specified,
and, in the opinion of the trial judge, the evidence may not
justify a recovery against some of them, the suit shall not
be dismissed as to all, but the case shall be submitted to the
jury, if the facts are in dispute, to determine which, if any
of them, are liable, or, if the facts are not in dispute, the
question of liability of any or all of them may be reserved
for consideration by the court en banc, or the suit may be
dismissed as to some and the trial proceed against the others,
'First 'National Bank of Pittsburg v. Baird, supra note 3, at IoO, 15o At.
at 168.
1P. L. 981 (No. 401). It is interesting that there is a reference to the
Joint Suit Act for the purpose of comparison in the Pittsburg Bank opinion,
supra note 3, at I00 et seq., 15o AtI. at 168.
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in every such contingency, with the same effect as if the defendants ultimately found to be liable were the only ones
alleged to be so." (Italics ours.)
This Act is in full force. It applies to every case in which there
are joint defendants, for the unequivocal words "whenever it is
pleaded in any suit" admit of no exception.
It follows inevitably that there is no impropriety from a
technical standpoint in applying the Joint Suit Act to proceedings
under the Sci. Fa. Act of 1929 and in dismissing from the case
at the close of plaintiff's testimony one or other of the alleged
joint defendants. This result is certainly not desirable and would
in fact defeat the purpose of the Act to the extent that it would
deprive the original joint defendant of the opportunity of putting
on his own evidence to implicate the added joint co-defendant
before that added joint co-defendant could obtain a nonsuit in
cases where the evidence produced on behalf of the plaintiff did
not chance to show negligence on the part of that added joint
co-defendant, and where plaintiff was content to obtain a verdict
against only the original joint defendant.
The courts, however, certainly cannot legislate to remedy the
undesirable result. There does not seem to be any remedy for
this situation other than further legislation. It would seem that
the regrettable result must be that until such further legislation,
the Sci. Fa. Act of 1929 should be limited in its application to the
situation of liability over, since it cannot consistently be worked
out under existing unrepealed statutes in the situation of joint
liability.
It should furthermore be pointed out that the purpose of the
Act, namely, to settle all respective rights of the parties in a single
suit, is directly defeated in the situation of joint liability, if
Justice Simpson's statements (several times reiterated in his two
opinions interpreting the Act) that the plaintiff gets no direct right
of action against the added defendant, are applied.2 7 It would
seem that this is one of the most powerful reasons for not "wresting the words [of the Vinvacombe and Pittsburgh Bank opin'The extent to which the purpose of the Act is fulfilled by the decisions in
the situation of liability over is discussed supra page 308.

THE PENNSYLVANIA

SCI. FA. ACT

ions] relied on from their subject-matter and obvious purpose
. . however general the language may be . .
,, 28 It is
submitted that what was said in the Vinnacombe and Pittsburgh
Bank cases was intended to apply only to the situation of liability
over and should under no circumstances be applied to the situation
of joint liability. In the latter situation, if the plaintiff is to be
denied his right to obtain directly a judgment against the additional joint defendant, his failure to recover against the original
defendant would of course not constitute res adjudicataas to his
rights against the additional joint defendant. This would open
the way for further litigation by plaintiff against the additional
joint defendant, and the Act of 1929 would have failed of its
comprehensive purpose.
29
In the unreported case of Simpson et al. v. Loutt et al,

President Judge Finletter interpreted the Act "as it is written"
and conducted the trial in all respects as if two joint defendants
"had been originally sued." Fortunately, the irreconcilable question of whether or not either defendant was entitled to a nonsuit
under the Joint Suit Act did not arise. In that case the plaintiff
was a passenger in the back seat of an automobile which collided
at right angles with an automobile driven by the original defendant. The latter by sci. fa. alleging joint liability, brought upon
the record the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff was a
back seat occupant. The added defendant was not in fact plaintiff's agent, so that there was no contributofy negligence in the
case. President Judge Finletter charged the jury that they might
find a verdict for the plaintiff against either defendant, or against
both, precisely as if both defendants had been originally sued by
the plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the original
defendant but against the additional defendant and in favor of
the plaintiff. This verdict was allowed to stand by the court
Schnee et al. v. Elston et ux., supra, note 24, at io6, 149 Atl. at

109.

88,93.
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en banc, and judgment in favor of the original defendant and in
favor of the plaintiff directly against the additional defendant was
entered. No appeal was taken.
Another consideration which would seem to point to the
necessity for further legislation is the situation where plaintiff
originally sues as joint defendants under the Joint Suit Act, X
and Y. X fears that Y may obtain a nonsuit before X's testimony is put on. Would it be a prudent measure on the part
of counsel for X in spite of the fact that Y is already on the
record as a joint defendant, to add Y to the record a second time
as joint defendant, "as if such other had been originally sued"?
If the last quoted words of the Sci. Fa. Act mean anything, this
is clearly not necessary, for he has already been originally sued,
but if the Sci. Fa. Act, ipso facto, without repealer clause and
without verbal inconsistency, repealed the Joint Suit Act so as
to defeat the right of nonsuit as to one of two joint defendants
brought in under the Sci. Fa. Act, then counsel for X should
certainly take such a precautionary step. This is merely another feature showing the impossibility of sensibly applying the
present legislation to the situation of joint defendants. 30
It is respectfully submitted that the accomplishment in the
fullest possible manner of the purpose of the Sci. Fa.Act as stated
at the beginning of this article is thoroughly desirable, but that this
purpose cannot be accomplished in any satisfactory way without
a most extensive revision of the legislation, particularly with a
view to distinguishing carefully between the situations of liability
over and of joint and several liability. With regard to the former situation, an adjudication of the direct rights of the plaintiff,
'The words of the Sci. Fa. Act "severally liable with", if they mean anything at all, would seem clearly to indicate an intention to give to a plaintiff a
direct right of action against an added defendant who has been added on the
theory that he is severally liable, as if he had been severally "originally sued".
This aspect of the Act has been three times ignored, within the knowledge of
the writer, in decisions of the lower courts. See O'Brien et ax. v. Erb, et (i.,
supra note io, in which a writ of sci. fa. was quashed on the ground that it
alleged on behalf of the original defendant that "the accident was caused solely
by reason of the negligence" of the additional defendant. To the same effect is
a ruling of President Judge Stern in Kauffman v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra note
IO. See also the words of Gordon, Jr., J., in commenting upon pleadings which

were said to be defective in Cohen v. Philadelphia Rural Transit Co.,

supra note lo.
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in cases where direct rights exist, against the added defendant,
should be made possible in order fully to accomplish the Act's
comprehensive purpose. In the situation of joint and several liability, the respective rights of each of the parties as against each
of the other parties should be brought within the scope of the
adjudication "according to equitable principles", and inconsistent,
unrepealed legislation should be spedifically mentioned and, to the
extent necessary, modified.

